Spontoon Naval Affairs Primer

by Ken Pick

In Spontoon's time (the mid-1930s), the battleship-based navy is the strategic weapons system - despite the evangelism of airpower advocates, aircraft are still unproven, with great potential but also serious limitations. The size of navies and types of warships are defined and constrained by a series of arms limitation treaties, primarily the Washington Treaty of 1924, the London Treaty of 1930, and the Spontoon Treaty of 1926.

• The Washington Treaty (1922-24) was negotiated after the Great War to head off a postwar arms race; it defined the types of warships and their maximum sizes, set the maximum sizes of the signatory navies in a three-tier ranking system, and froze development of naval bases (with specified exceptions).
• The London Treaty (1930) is a follow-on to the Washington Treaty, further defining and limiting ship types (primarily cruisers) and naval bases; as its name suggests, it was instigated by the British Empire to rein in other navies from becoming too much of a threat to the British Empire's far-flung sea lanes.
• The Spontoon Treaty (1926) extends the Washington Treaty to the smaller Pacific naval powers, heading off a secondary arms race caused by "Washington's Fire Sale", when the Washington Treaty powers started selling off their excess warships to the (non-signatory) Pacific Island powers.

Vostokaya Zemyla was the trigger; with HRH the Grand Duchess a cousin to the King of England, access to the Romanov Crown Jewels for financing, and a grievance culture against the Bolsheviki mainland. The White Russians' Last Tsardom started buying surplus warships from the British Empire and what was left of Germany; other Pacific powers, not wanting to be left out, starting a bidding war and a short-lived "black market in battleships". A threatened Japan called in the other Great Powers, who essentially forced the Spontoon Treaty on the Pacific powers to bring their navies into line with the Washington Treaty and stop the new arms race.

Warships 101: Basic Concepts

Warship design is a juggling of four factors for a given size of ship: firepower, speed, protection (armor), and range; increasing any of these factors requires reducing the others. The normal method to maximize all four - build a bigger ship - is now impossible due to Treaty limitations on size, requiring sacrifices to be made in all new design and construction. In addition, a bigger and more powerful ship is more expensive, so fewer can be built; too few, and they cannot be everywhere they're needed and can be "mobbed" by smaller ships using sheer weight of numbers; too many, and they will be too small and outclassed by the enemy ship-for-ship.

Examples:

• Long range is required for operations in the Pacific; American battleships have sacrificed speed (five knots slower than any other Dreadnaughts) and pioneered "all-or-nothing" protection to maximize firepower and protection while retaining enough range. Japanese battleships are slightly faster and equally well-armed, but at a cost in protection; British battleships are similar, due to the Royal Navy's need to deploy anywhere in the world.
• The direct opposite of American battleships are British-style battle-cruisers, who before the Great War maximized firepower and speed under the design philosophy of Admiral "Jackie" Fisher. With long-range required for Royal Navy deployments, British battle-cruisers paid for their firepower, speed, and range with little or no protection - "Battleship firepower, Cruiser speed, and effectively no armor". Their German opposite numbers sacrificed firepower for better protection, and were better described as "fast, light battleships".
• Italian and French ships are optimized for short-range Mediterranean operations, and are known for their high speeds as well as competitive firepower and protection. The German High Seas Fleet (before the Great War) was similarly designed for short-range North Sea operations against the Royal Navy; the butcher's bill for Jutland/Skagerrak in 1916 proved German ships (especially battle-cruisers) to be much more survivable than their British counterparts.

Warship size is measured by Standard Displacement Tonnage or "Treaty Tonnage"; as defined by the Washington Treaty, this is the weight of the ship including crew, provisions, and ammunition but not including fuel. (Fully loaded but with fuel tanks empty.) Treaty limits on Navy sizes are expressed in maximum tonnage allowed of each major warship type.

Warship Types (as defined by Treaty):

Capital Ships (Battleships & Battle-cruisers - "big-gun" ships of over 10,000 tons)

Commonly called "battleships" or "Dreadnaughts" (after HMS Dreadnaught, the first modern battleship), these are the largest and heaviest warships afloat, whose "battle line" is the traditional measure of sea power. Maximum size 35,000 tons, maximum 16" guns (though the British are appealing to restore a deleted clause of the London Treaty limiting guns to 14" when new construction is allowed to begin). In addition, new construction is prohibited until 1935; older ships may be modernized in lieu of new replacements so long as the resulting ship does not violate the Treaty.

The two basic types of capital ship mainly differ in speed and protection:

• Battleships are heavily armored but slow (20-25 knots).
• Battle-cruisers are fast but sacrifice armor protection to achieve cruiser speeds (around 30 knots), the most extreme cases being British battle-cruisers. They were originally intended as "cruiser-killers" and fast raiders/heavy scouts but their battleship-sized guns often meant they were used to reinforce battleships with fatal results. The need of fast heavy ships to escort the new "aircraft carriers" has opened up a third role.
• A third type - the "fast battleship" - is evolving from the Treaty limitations and the hope that advances in armor and propulsion technology will allow new-construction Treaty battleships to incorporate battleship armor and battle-cruiser speed.

Though not defined as such by the Treaties, capital ships are also (unofficially) rated by their gun size: First class = 15 or 16"; Second class = 13 to 14"; Third class = 11 or 12".

Battleships are a true "strategic weapons system" - expensive enough that they can bankrupt a country, a sure war-winner when only one side has them, and "too expensive to risk" when both sides have them at or near parity. During the Great War, the British and German battle fleets sat at anchor in Scapa Flow and Wilhelmshaven for the entire war - with the 1916 exception of Jutland/Skagerrak. As long as the British fleet stayed in Scapa Flow, its presence blocked the Germans from coming out; however, keeping the German fleet bottled up that way meant it couldn't leave Scapa to fight in other theaters. So the expensive battleships sat in port while the real fighting went on with light stuff - U-boats, convoy escorts, and small raiding cruisers.

Aircraft Carriers

Primarily "floating aerodromes", this new type of warship acts as a mobile air base for combat aircraft. Maximum size 23,000 tons; maximum of 10 guns over 5" (but not exceeding 8") for self-defense against surface ships. Though some of the older British & Japanese carriers have only battleship speeds (20-25 knots), all later-construction carriers are as fast as cruisers (30+ knots).

In Spontoon's era, aircraft carriers cannot operate aircraft at night or in bad weather, and are vulnerable to surface attack in such conditions; hence the larger ones are armed with cruiser guns for self-defense. Battleships may also escort carriers against surface attack, but this handicaps the faster carriers since formation speed is only as fast as the slowest ship. (This especially handicaps the American navy, who has the fastest carriers and slowest battleships; their two battle-cruisers are usually detailed to escort and protect the carriers whenever possible.) A carrier's main function is to provide long-range reconnaissance and "air cover" against air attack for the battle fleet, with a secondary role as hit-and-run airstrikes. Aerial attack on ships is normally by torpedo - current aerial bombs are too small to penetrate the deck armor of a battleship - though the American and Japanese navies are working on something called "dive-bombing".

Carrier advocates (known as "brown-shoe" admirals after regulation footwear color for aviators in the US and British navies) are engaged in an inter-service rivalry with the "black-shoe" advocates of the traditional battleships; for now, the battle line (able to provide close-in continuous firepower with their big guns) is the senior and dominant "queen of battles" while the aircraft carriers (providing long-range "surge" firepower with airstrikes but handicapped by recovery and turnaround times) are a secondary weapons system.

Cruisers

As our mother the Frigate, bepainted and fine,
Made play for her bully the Ship of the Line;
So we, her bold daughters by iron and fire,
Accost and decoy to our masters' desire.
- Rudyard Kipling, 1899

The "traditional workhorse of the fleet", cruisers are fast (30+ knots) medium-sized gun-and-torpedo warships. Maximum size 10,000 tons, maximum 8" guns. Cruisers armed with 6" guns or smaller are "light cruisers"; those with larger guns (up to 8") are "heavy cruisers". Since the Washington Treaty, almost all cruiser construction has been "Treaty Cruisers" - 10,000 ton heavy cruisers packing as many 8" guns as possible (8 for British designs, 9 for Americans, 10 for Japanese). Light cruisers are mostly older types left over from the Great War, about half that size.

The London Treaty sets a limit on a navy's maximum tonnage of heavy cruisers, forcing all subsequent cruisers to be light cruisers, with future construction limited to the German maximum size of 8,000 tons and 6" guns. This was pushed through by the British to force a large number of smaller cruisers, similar to British naval requirements of more cruisers to patrol the Empire's long sea lanes.

• The Royal Navy's cruisers are primarily light cruisers, patrolling sea lanes in peacetime and scouting ahead of the battle fleet in wartime; their older "C" and "D"-class light cruisers are also popular among minor Pacific nations. British shipyards will build for any non-hostile navy; many of the British-built "foreign" ships (such as the Improved "E"-class) are to modified designs more advanced than the Admiralty's own.
• The American Navy is cruiser-poor; their only light cruisers are ten "Omahas" of a prewar design and all subsequent construction has been post-Treaty heavy cruisers without torpedo tubes. American cruiser doctrine is to engage at long (outside torpedo) range whenever possible, using their heavy cruisers as "miniature battleships"; Americans normally use destroyers for scouting and patrol roles.
• The Japanese Navy also prefers heavy cruisers, but continues mounting heavy torpedo armament on them. (Either they plan to engage at both short and long ranges, or they have developed a very long-range torpedo.) Japanese light cruisers are normally used as flagships for destroyer flotillas.

Destroyers

The stripped hulls, slinking through the gloom,
At gaze and gone again -
The Brides of Death that wait the groom -
The Choosers of the Slain!
- Rudyard Kipling, "The Destroyers", 1898

Light screening and torpedo-attack ships, usually with a top speed of over 30 knots for hit-and-run attacks. Maximum size 2000 tons, 5" guns, torpedoes.

In Spontoon's period, destroyers are still primarily for torpedo attacks on surface ships and protecting the battle fleet against the same, with anti-submarine and anti-aircraft escort clearly in second place. During the Great War, destroyers' speed and endurance were pretty much wasted as convoy escorts to much-slower merchant ships.

Due to their lack of light cruisers, the American Navy uses destroyers for general patrol and scouting, though even at treaty-limit size they do poorly in rough seas.

Torpedo-boats

The smaller ancestor of the Destroyer. As Destroyers, except maximum size 800 tons (usually achieved by sacrificing range and rough-water capability).

Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany cannot possess true destroyers, only torpedo-boats. They are also the light warship of choice for the Italian Navy, whose restricted Mediterranean waters makes long range unnecessary. Torpedo-boats are also popular among several minor Pacific navies, as they are much cheaper than full-size destroyers. Their only handicaps in Pacific operations are their short range and poor rough-water capability.

Submarines

The infamous "U-Boat" of the Great War, a specialized torpedo-boat raider that submerges to sneak up on its target. The Washington and London Treaties do not limit submarines, due to irresolvable disagreements between the signatory nations; however, they do hold them to the same "warn, stop, and board" behavior as surface raiders in a reaction against the last war's U-boats - impractical considering a submarine's small size and crew and vulnerability on the surface.

In Spontoon's era, submarines are of two main types: small, short-range "Coastal" boats of 800 tons or less and larger, longer-range "Cruisers" up to the size of destroyers. Both spend most of their time on the surface, submerging only to attack or evade. Submerging cuts the sub's speed by more than half, and battery capacity limits submerged maneuvering to one day or less before being forced to surface and recharge.

By tradition, all submarines are "boats", not "ships". They are often called "coffins" since many have been lost in peacetime accidents; and when a submarine sinks - wartime or peacetime - there are normally no survivors.

Gunboats

General-purpose light patrol/escort craft, the most common type of ship in Spontoon's Pacific. Maximum size 2000 tons; maximum armament no more than four main guns of over 3" but not more than 6" caliber, no torpedoes; top speed around 20 knots.

A typical maximum-size Treaty Gunboat is the American Erie type: 2000 tons, 20 knots, four 6" guns, two quad .50-caliber AA machine guns, and one seaplane (no catapult; the gunboat must stop and lower its scout plane over the side). Most gunboats are smaller, such as the new American "PCE" design - a couple hundred tons with a pair of 3" guns, a multiple AA machine gun mount, and a rack of anti-submarine depth charges.

Auxiliaries

Seaplane tenders (like carriers, but for seaplanes), destroyer tenders (supply "motherships" for destroyer flotillas), repair and supply ships - important roles, but not main-line combat ships. Maximum size 10,000 tons, maximum armament as per gunboats.

The Imperial Japanese Navy makes the most use of seaplane tenders, using them almost as secondary aircraft carriers. Japanese doctrine is to always use seaplanes for fleet reconnaissance; because of this, new-construction Japanese seaplane tenders are the fastest in the world - almost as fast as cruisers.

Washington's Cherry Trees - "Superships"

This is the Press's name for larger-than-legal capital ships and aircraft carriers allowed to be retained by the Treaty navies under a "grandfather clause". The plans and building programs for these superships (all super-battleships and super-battlecruisers, which threatened to bankrupt the major naval powers) were the cause of the Washington Treaty; under Treaty provisions, if a supership had reached a certain stage of completion (i.e. been launched and was floating), the signatory nation was allowed to complete it as-planned. In addition, up to two unlaunched superships of each signatory nation (effectively the US, British Empire and Japan) were allowed to be converted into giant aircraft carriers.

Sixteen superships exist in the world:

• British fast super-battleships HMS Invincible & Inflexible (42,000 tons, 9x16" guns), super-battlecruisers HMS Hood & Anson (42,000 tons, 8x15" guns), and super-carriers HMS Indomitable & Indefatigable (32,000 tons, built on Invincible hulls).
• American super-battleships USS Indiana & South Dakota (42,000 tons, 12x16" guns), super-battlecruisers USS Constellation & Constitution ("American Hoods" of 42,000 tons, 8x16" guns), and super-carriers USS Lexington & Saratoga (33,000 tons, built on Constellation hulls).
• Japanese super-battleships IJN Kaga & Tosa (40,000 tons, 10x16" guns) and super-carriers IJN Amagi & Akagi (30,000 tons, built on super-battlecruiser hulls).

Navy Ranking and Sizes (as defined by Treaty):

First-rate Navies: United States Navy (USA), Royal Navy (British Empire/Commonwealth)

"Two-ocean Navies" limited to 600,000 tons of capital ships, 200,000 tons aircraft carriers, 200,000 tons heavy cruisers. With the Washington Treaty, the Royal Navy abandoned its previous size of "as large as the next two largest navies combined" for simple parity with the next-largest; the expense needed to build and maintain such a "three-ocean navy" was too much for the Empire's war-strained economy; ever since, the Brits have attempted to maintain naval superiority by treaty-limiting other powers.

Royal Navy fleet strength as of 1932: 16 battleships (2 super, 10 1st-rate, 4 2nd-rate); 4 battle-cruisers (2 super, 2 2nd-rate); 8 aircraft carriers (2 super, 6 fleet, 2 light); 19 heavy cruisers; 35 light cruisers.

US Navy fleet strength as of 1934: 15 battleships (2 super, 4 1st-rate, 9 2nd-rate); 2 super-battlecruisers; 3 aircraft carriers (2 super, 1 light); 17 heavy cruisers; 10 light cruisers.

Second-rate Navy: Imperial Japanese Navy

"One-ocean Navy" limited to 420,000 tons of capital ships, 140,000 tons aircraft carriers, 140,000 tons heavy cruisers. Proud and xenophobic, the Japanese Empire still rankles at being limited to second-rate status; with new construction limited by Treaty, they extensively modernize their existing ships and have kept their new-construction program a secret.

Fleet strength as of 1935: 8 battleships (2 super, 2 1st-rate, 4 2nd-rate); 4 battle-cruisers (2nd-rate); 5 aircraft carriers (2 super, 3 light); 8 heavy cruisers; 17 light cruisers.

Third-rate Navies: France, Italy, Germany, Vostokaya Zemyla, Kuo Han

"Half-ocean Navies" limited to 225,000 tons of capital ships, 80,000 tons aircraft carriers, 80,000 tons heavy cruisers. In practice, this means 6-8 battleships, 3-4 aircraft carriers, and 8 heavy cruisers if built to the limit. None of these navies have built to the limit in all three Treaty-limited categories; the only two who come close are Kuo Han and Vostokaya Zemyla.

The German Navy, as the official loser of the Great War, has additional restrictions, but this is outside the scope of Pacific Operations.

Who's Who in Naval Affairs: Hector Bywater

Hector Bywater of London (b.1884) is the premier naval-affairs journalist and analyst in the world. His histories and analyses of Royal Navy operations in the Great War (including his own memoirs as a Naval Intelligence "operative") made his name in naval intelligence circles outside of his native England, but his main claim to fame these days are his Sea Power in the Pacific and Great Pacific War. His publisher claims that Naval Intelligence departments of all the world's major naval powers have standing subscription orders for any and all of Bywater's future books.

First published in 1922 at the start of the Washington Treaty Conference, Sea Power in the Pacific is a detailed analysis of naval strengths, weaknesses, and potential strategies and operational doctrines concerning Pacific conditions, with an emphasis on the two largest Pacific Powers: the United States and Japan. Since then, with the London and Spontoon treaties and the rise of Vostokaya Zemyla, Mr. Bywater has revised his work every few years to analyze the changing situation; at present, Sea Power is on its Fourth Edition.

Mr. Bywater's only work of fiction, Great Pacific War (1925) is a faux-history account of a 1931 naval war between the USA and Japan, presenting the theories and conclusions of Sea Power in a dry narrative form - primarily that the geography of the Pacific and the relative industrial capacities of the USA and Japan would be the decisive factors shaping any such conflict. The "novel" appears to have been written in response to several sensationalist novels on the subject; in his preface, Mr. Bywater writes "...it has been my aim to keep well within the bounds of reasonable probability, and not to sacrifice reality for the sake of dramatic effect. [For example,] I might have conveyed whole Japanese army corps to San Francisco and allowed them to overrun the Pacific Slope" - a veiled but direct reference to The Valor of Ignorance, a well-selling sensationalist "future war" novel by eccentric amateur (and part-time Chinese warlord) Homer Lea.

Mr. Bywater is currently on the lecture circuit, and is scheduled to appear at the Spontoon Island Casino next summer to lecture on the subject "The Great Pacific War - Could It Really Happen?" This lecture is expected to be attended by naval attachés from across the Pacific.