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16 February 2009
  Histories & Tales of the Gunboat Wars
Essays & Stories by Walter D. Reimer

"Battle of Gunboat Atoll"

an essay about the Pirate Raids


Gunboat Atoll
Excerpted © 2008 by Walter D. Reimer
 from ‘Minor Warship Actions’ - part of the Battle Problems series –
 Rain Island Military Collective Press, 1964)


        During the series of actions in the North Pacific described as the Pirate, or Gunboat Wars (1911-1913), most battles were conducted by vessels that could only be loosely and charitably categorized as warships.  Many were converted fishing boats, freight carriers or old clipper sailing ships.  These vessels were manned and maintained by polyglot crews hired from various countries scattered throughout the region and who fought with varying levels of professionalism.
        As the name suggests, many of the crews were pirates, seeking out and seizing freighters or territory for profit.  Many of the so-called Great or colonial Powers and even some second-rank nations in the region gave tacit support to these depredations, as it was a useful clandestine source of income as well as a distraction from events taking place in Europe. 
        Speculation as to specifically how, when and where the Gunboat Wars began is a task made particularly difficult owing to the dearth of written records concerning that time.  Many records were either destroyed or allowed to decay over time, or orders were given verbally. 
        It must be said at this point that it is a source of national shame for Rain Island that several of its naval militia units at that time went pirate.  There are records of actions taking place between loyal and pirate units (notably the action off Blefuscu, covered in another chapter). 
        Returning to the subject at paw, the level of tension between the nations in the area rose as the attacks by pirates increased, with each state accusing the other of inciting piracy in order to gain some advantage. 
        Matters came to a head in the late summer of 1912 when three opposing coalitions assembled forces and fought at Paze (later Gunboat) Atoll.  Out of all of the actions of the Gunboat Wars, this is the best-documented.
         At the time, the most powerful formal warship in the region was the armored cruiser Rurik of the Imperial Russian Navy (15,000 tons).  Commissioned in 1909 as a successor to an earlier Rurik, the ship carried a main armament of four ten-inch guns in two double turrets and had a maximum of six inches of armor plating at the waterline.  In contrast, most of the weaponry carried by the pirates and other opposing forces consisted of small arms and primitive machine guns such as the US-made Gatling gun; cannon ran the gamut of armament from antique muzzle-loading Dahlgren guns to breech-loading five-inch cannon.  Sacrificing protection for speed, many pirate boats did not have armor plating.
        A powerful equalizing force at the time was the use of the naval torpedo, whether as a fixed-point mine or as a self-propelled antiship weapon.  The most notable of these weapons was the Whitehead torpedo (q.v.) and its successors.  Many admirals lived in fear that these small weapons, carried to their destination by small boats or even by swimmers, could destroy much larger warships.
        Another albeit untested factor was the use of aerial units.  Rain Island had several aerial militia units operating from a base on Spontoon’s Eastern Island, but these were limited in terms of speed and firepower until the advent of the Nanaimo class of semi-rigid airship in 1913.  Non-rigid airships were effective as observation platforms as well as ground attack roles.  Various experiments were made using the primitive fixed-wing aircraft of the day, and lessons learned from these actions stood several nations in good stead when the Great War erupted in 1914.
        The Rurik was opposed by a smaller ship of the British Royal Navy, the Town-class armored cruiser Barrow-in-Furryness (4800 tons).  Despite being outclassed by the Russian ship in nearly every regard (the Barrow had a four-knot speed advantage), the two ships had never encountered each other until the start of the battle. 
        On August 8, 1912, word had been received by the British at New Penzance that a pirate force was assembling to take and fortify Paze Atoll (80 miles NNW of Spontoon Atoll) for the purposes of establishing another base in the area.  Pirates, some of whom were once loyal to Rain Island, had already garrisoned Krupmark Island after the British settlement there had been razed by an unknown adversary.  The colonial authorities immediately began gathering forces and created a flotilla centered on Barrow as force flagship.  According to records, the Barrow’s captain was given the brevet rank of Commodore for the duration of the action.  The British-led flotilla left port on August 27.
        News of the pirate activity and the British response reached the Russian Fleet base at Vladivostok, prompting the commander there to dispatch the Rurik and several escort ships.  Notable among the escorts was the freighter V. K. Ivanov, which had been converted to carry two airships, the Orel (Eagle) and the Yastreb (Hawk).  Collecting a force of smaller vessels (including some gunboats from Japan and Kuo Han) as escorts, the Russian force left from its base at Vostok Island on September 5.
        The Rain Coast Republic had also received information regarding the pirates and was determined to put a stop to their countrymen’s activities.  The force they assembled consisted of nineteen ships of various sizes (from 150 to 2000 tons) under a senior captain chosen by lot.  This force departed Rain Coast waters on September 1st.
        Records concerning the strength of the pirate force gathered around Paze Atoll at this time are sketchy, but evidence exists that they had a fixed (tethered) balloon on one of the islands as an observation post.
        The Vanirge-registered torpedo boat Sleipnir (with the British flotilla) made first contact with what its logs recorded as “the enemy” on the night of September 10, 1912.  Leading a group of five similarly-equipped boats, the Sleipnir closed to firing range and opened fire with its Whitehead torpedoes.  The commander’s log states that his ship scored three hits before he had to turn away to avoid being fired upon.  Unfortunately, in the darkness the Sleipnir had mistakenly fired upon the Rain Coast group, destroying two ships and severely damaging a third.  As the group retreated they were fired upon, another Vanirgean boat being damaged.
        The night action started a free-for-all in the dark, with commanders trying to signal by lamps and searchlights stabbing through the darkness.  By the time the action was broken off in the early morning of the 11th the British group had sustained losses of two ships sunk and four damaged to varying degrees, while the Rain Coast had lost four of its nineteen ships. 
        The Russians raised Paze Atoll and the pirate fleet that morning and the Rurik began to make its presence known, firing ten-inch shells into the settlement on the atoll’s five islands while the Eagle and Hawk maintained observation positions above the formation.  The Russian escort ships fought the pirate ships effectively until the pirates started using torpedoes at extreme range (about one thousand yards).  Several ships were destroyed in the torpedo ‘duel’ that followed, and the Rurik had to break off as the threat grew.
        The British force arrived late in the day, another escort commander mistakenly surmising that it was the Russians who attacked during the night.  The action that followed degenerated into what one analyst has called a ‘dogfight’ – a three-cornered contest between the British, Russians and pirates.  By the time night fell, the Rurik and the Barrow had both sustained damage from shell hits, the Barrow being more heavily damaged by the Russian ship’s heavier guns.  Both forces drew off (the Russians to the north, the British to the southwest) to lick their wounds.
        During the night it is believed that a small pirate boat succeeded in penetrating the Russian escort screen, detonating a torpedo against the hull of the Rurik and leaving the cruiser with a pronounced list and numerous fires.  The cruiser played no further part in the action and later sank.
        The Rain Coast force, having withdrawn to Tatoosh Atoll after the night action on the 10th, arrived on the morning of the 12th and engaged the remaining pirates.  Its fifteen ships had been reinforced by a small group from the Spontoons, and this force succeeded in destroying the remnant of the pirate fleet.  However, even as the crews began to celebrate their victory the British force reappeared and sank several more Rain Coast ships (losing five of their own in the process) before they realized their mistake.
        The Russian airship carrier Ivanov and the remaining ships of its group evaded and moved south.  The surviving airship Eagle was lost in an aerial engagement with a Rain Coast blimp later, and with the Japanese and Kuo Han ships having either suffered damage or having no more stomach for the fight, the Russian force dispersed and headed back to its ports.
        The Barrow-in-Furryness managed to repair most of its damage while underway, returning to New Penzance on September 17.  Its mixed bag of escorts, comprising ships and boats from Vanirge, New Penzance and Japan, then dispersed.

        The results of the Battle of Gunboat Atoll (as the island group was later renamed) cemented Rain Coast’s status as a second-rank power in the region as well as allaying Spontoonie fears that the Republic had any designs on the Independencies.  This strengthening of ties would be fruitful and profitable for both sides over the next decades.  It exacerbated tensions between the British and the Russians in the Pacific which were eased only slightly by their alliance in the 1914-1918 War.
        The best result of the Gunboat Atoll battle was that it broke the back of any organized pirate activity in the region for over twenty years.  Between 1912 and 1935 any piratical activity was either sporadic or carried out by ships operating under letters of marque by legitimate governments.  After 1935, the criminal combine on Krupmark Island reorganized piracy and restricted its activities to areas outside of Rain Island’s jurisdiction.  Small crews continue to operate, however, subject to surveillance and arrest by aerial and maritime patrols.
        Naval air power was first demonstrated at Gunboat Atoll with the use of airships and one fixed-wing aircraft.  Acting on theory and the successful exploits of the American Eugene Ely in 1910 and the British Commander Rumney in May 1912, the British fitted a flight deck to the Japanese collier Hime Maru.  The plane, a single-seat Farman III pusher with a maximum speed of 37 miles per hour, was used in both reconnaissance and attack roles.  It accounted for the first casualties ever caused by aerial attack when the plane’s pilot, Mr. Herbert Gray of New Penzance, shot and killed a crewfur aboard one of the pirate vessels using a Webley revolver.
        Rain Coast (Rain Island after 1920) was quick to embrace the idea of naval air power, fitting out several naval militia ships as seaplane or airship tenders and joining them with aerial militia units.  These units became the nucleus of the Naval Syndicate’s Air Arm.
 
        Lessons learned from the Battle of Gunboat Atoll begin with the necessity of good intelligence as to the specific strength of the opposing force.  Second only to this primary factor is the need for reconnaissance and for knowing when to engage the enemy.  All sides in this action (with the exception of Rain Coast) used air power to observe their adversaries.
        What did the various sides do wrong?  Neither side had a clear idea of who was in the battle zone.  The Rain Coast Republic force did not communicate with either the British or the Russians until the 12th, by which time they had already been mistakenly attacked, and (compounding the error) the formation was again attacked.  The Russian force did not take into account the range or relative effectiveness of naval torpedoes in combat.  A tighter escort screen on the night of the 11th and better use of searchlights might have saved the Rurik.
        The Battle of Gunboat Atoll remains the largest surface action fought by the Rain Coast (later Rain Island) until the start of the Pacific War.  During that time the lessons taught by that action were discussed and argued by ordinary sailors as well as by the Syndics and war planners.


end of excerpt

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